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France  Abstract 
The problem under consideration in this paper is that of analysing the performance of a production unit m two 
directions: resource utilization versus output perfomance on the one hand and inter unit comparison (within group 
evaluation) on the other hand, all this subjected to possible subjective intervention of a decision maker or group of 
decision makers (DMs). A well known method that deals mainly with the second point (without intervention of DMs) of 
this problem which is widely covered in the literature is the so called data envelopment analysis (DEA). The point of 
view that will be expressed in this paper can be thought of as complementary to the DEA approach giving a more 
complete analysis in terms of the weak points of units identification and DMs' recommendations. The performance of
each decision unit is evaluated through the so called satisfiability functions in the framework of satisficing game theory. 
Keywords: Production systems; Performance analysis; Efficiency evaluation; Group evaluation; DEA; Satisficing game theory I. Introduction 
The problem of evaluating production units' per-
formance is of great importance for efficient man-
agement decision making such as restructuring an 
organization, rewarding production teams, etc. We 
understand by production unit, a system that utilizes 
some input items (resources) to produce some * Tel.: +33 5 62 44 42 53; fax: +33 5 62 44 42 19. 
E-mail addresses: ayeley.tchangani@iut-tarbes.fr, 
tchangani@caramail.com, Ayeley.Tchangani@enit.fr. goods or to deliver some service. It could be a 
hospital, a manufacturing plant, a university, a po-
lice department, etc. The purpose here is to evalu-
ate the efficiency in terms of resource utilization 
versus output performance of each production unit 
of an organization U that consists of n production 
units. Each production unit is evaluated individually 
as well as with regard to its counterparts' efficien-
cy. We suppose that each unit of U uses p input 
items expressed as positive numbers !{ (value of 
item j used by unit i) to deliver m output items 
valued by O{ (value of item j produced by unit i). 
A first idea could be to define the efficiency ei of
unit i by
ei ¼
Xm
j¼1
O
j
i
Xp
j¼1
I
j
i
; ð1Þ
but this definition leads to some problems as all
input items or output items do not have the same
importance in practice. It is then tempting to weight
items in order to take into account this relative
importance so that the efficiency is defined by
ei ¼
Xm
j¼1
a ji O
j
i
Xp
j¼1
b ji I
j
i
; a ji ; b
j
i N0; ð2Þ
but here again, a problem relative to the determi-
nation of weights ai
j and bi
j is raised.
A method to deal with the determination of these
weights in the literature is the so called data envel-
opment analysis (DEA) established by [1]. It is an
extreme point method that determines weights ai
j
and bi
j in order to define a relative efficiency of
each unit compared to the best production unit
(possibly virtual) by solving n linear programs
(see for instance [2] for definition of linear
programming concepts).
But this approach has some technical drawbacks
that will be recalled in the next Section and more
importantly, we consider that the spirit of comparing
each unit to the bbest unitQ is not necessarily how
humans proceed in practice. They often evaluate
each unit firstly with regard to how efficiently it
uses its resources to produce its output and secondly
they look at how good this unit is compared to its
counterparts. If we think of how students are evalu-
ated, we see that each student is first evaluated
individually (their marks reflecting the effort they
have made) and then compared to the best student
of the same class. This observation suggests that a
production unit should be evaluated by comparing its
positive attributes (output performance) to its nega-
tive attributes (input or resource consumption) at first
and with regard to the other units in a second stage.Another important issue in the process of evaluating
production units is the possible existence of different
decision makers that do not have the same point of
view regarding the importance of input items and/or
output items and this constraint should be taken into
account. A framework that seems interesting to tack-
le this problem with is the recently developed satisfi-
cing game theory [3] that, basically for our problem,
will consist in defining selectability (with regard to
output items) and rejectability (with regard to input
items) functions known as satisfiability functions.
These functions must have a probability structure
(they are non-negative and sum to one on U)
which can be thought of as units sharing a unity
of input item to produce a unity of output item. An
efficient production unit will be that for which the
selectability is at least equal to the rejectability. We
consider here that there are d decision makers that
express their point of view regarding input items and
output items by weighting them.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: in the Second section the DEA method is briefly
presented with its strengths and its drawbacks; the
Third section is devoted to a rapid presentation of
satisficing game theory that is relevant to our problem
and the Fourth section shows how to cast performance
evaluation problems into the framework of this theory
and finally, in Section five, the approach we have
established is applied to a real world problem.2. Data envelopment analysis
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a technique
for assessing and ranking the performance of cor-
porations, research projects or other entities where an
entire array of indicators of performance are to be
evaluated. It was invented by [1] and is a linear
programming based technique for measuring the rel-
ative performance of organizational units where the
presence of multiple inputs and outputs makes com-
parisons dificult. It is an extreme point method and
compares each producer (also known in the DEA
literature as decision making unit or DMU) with
only the bbestQ producer (possibly virtual). A funda-
mental assumption behind the DEA method is that if
a given producer, A, is capable of producing Y(A)
units of output with X(A) inputs, then other produ-
cers should also be able to do the same if they were
to operate efficiently. Similarly, if producer B is
capable of producing Y(B) units of output with
X(B) inputs, then other producers should also be
capable of the same production schedule. Producers
A, B, and others can then be combined to form a
composite producer with composite inputs and com-
posite outputs. Since this composite producer does
not necessarily exist, it is sometimes called a virtual
producer. The heart of the analysis lies in finding the
bbestQ virtual producer for each real producer. If the
virtual producer is better than the original producer
by either making more output with the same input or
making the same output with less input then the
original producer is inefficient. The DEA method
has been applied in many situations such as: health
care (hospitals, doctors), education (schools, univer-
sities), banks, manufacturing, benchmarking, man-
agement evaluation, fast food restaurants, retail
stores, police departments (see for instance [8,9,6,
4,5,7]).
The procedure of finding the best virtual producer
can be formulated as a linear program. Analyzing the
efficiency of n producers then requires solving n
linear programming problems. The following formu-
lation is one of the standard forms for the DEA. We
consider that there are n producers, p input items and
m output items for each producer; the value of input
item j and the value of output item l for producer i are
Ii
j and Oi
j respectively. The n linear programming
problems to be solved are
max
a j
i
;b j
i
Xm
j¼1
a ji O
j
i
Xm
l¼1
aliO
l
k 
Xp
j¼1
b jk I
j
kV0; 1VkVn; k pi
ð3Þ
Xp
j¼1
b ji I
j
i ¼ 1
ali b
j
ize; 1ViVn; 1VlVm; 1VjVp
1ViVn
where e denotes a small strictly positive real number.2.1. Strengths of the DEA
The power of the DEA as a tool for performance
evaluation is due to the following characteristics.
! DEA can handle multiple input and multiple output
models.
! It doesn’t require an assumption of a functional
form relating inputs to outputs.
! DMUs are directly compared against the best (pos-
sibly virtual) DMU.
! Inputs and outputs can have very different units.
2.2. Limitations of the DEA
But the DEA method does have a number of draw-
backs reported in the literature (see [8]) among which
are the following concerns.
! A judicious choice of weights will lead to a high
proportion of units being efficient.
! A unit which has the highest ratio of one of the
outputs to one of the inputs will be efficient, or
have an efficiency which is very close to one by
putting as much weight as possible on that ratio
and the minimum weight (e) on the other inputs
and outputs.
! A unit can appear efficient simply because of its
pattern of inputs and outputs and not because of
any inherent efficiency.
! Since DEA is an extreme point technique, noise
(even symmetrical noise with zero mean) such
as measurement error can cause significant
problems.
! Since a standard formulation of the DEA creates a
separate linear program for each DMU, large pro-
blems can be computationally intensive.
In the next Section, we will briefly present the
concepts of satisficing game theory on which we
will build the approach that constitutes the purpose
of this paper.3. Satisficing game theory
The underlying philosophy of the DEA approach
for performance evaluation is superlative rationality
i.e., looking for the best. But the superlative ratio-
nality paradigm is not necessarily the way humans
evaluate options (and maybe not the best one). Most
of the time humans content themselves with options
that are just bgood enoughQ; the concept of being
good enough allows a certain flexibility because one
can always adjust one’s aspiration level. On the
other hand, decision makers more probably tend
to classify units as good enough or not good
enough in terms of their positive attributes (benefit)
and their negative attributes (cost) with regard to the
evaluation goal instead of ranking units with regard
to each other. For instance, to evaluate cars, we
often make a list of positive attributes (driving
comfort, speed, robustness, etc.) and a list of neg-
ative attributes (price, petrol consumption, maintain-
ability, etc.) of each car and then make a list of cars
for which positive attributes bexceedQ negative attri-
butes in some sense. This way of evaluation falls
into the framework of praxeology or the study of
the theory of practical activity (the science of effi-
cient action) derived from epistemic logic (the
branch of philosophy that classifies propositions
on the basis of knowledge and belief regarding
their content; for a proposition to be admissible it
must be both believable and informative) and de-
veloped by [3]. Here decision maker(s), instead of
looking for the best options, look for the satisficing
options.
Satisficing is a term that refers to a decision
making strategy where options, units or alternatives
are selected which are bgood enoughQ instead of
being the best [3]. Let us consider a universe U of
options, alternatives or units; then for each unit u
a U; a selectability function pS(u) and a reject
ability function pR(u) are defined so that pS(u)
measures the degree to which u works towards
success in achieving the decision maker’s goal
and pR(u) is the cost associated with this unit.
This pair of measures called satisfiability functions
must have the mathematical structure of probabili-
ties [3]: they are non-negative and sum to one on
U. The following definition then gives the set of
options which can be considered to be bgood
enoughQ because, for these options, the bbenefitQ
expressed by the function pS exceeds the bcostQ
expressed by the function pR with regard to an
index of caution q.Definition 1. The satisficing set Rq p U is the set of
units defined by
Rq ¼ uaU : pS uð ÞzqpR uð Þf g: ð4Þ
But for a satisficing unit u there can exist other
satisficing units that are better (having more select-
ability and at most the same rejectability or having
less rejectability and at least the same selectability)
than u; it is obvious that in this case any rational
decision maker will prefer the latter units. So the
interesting set is that containing satisficing units for
which there are no better units: this is called the
satisficing equilibrium set ESq . To define this set, let
us define first, for any unit u a U, the set B(u) of units
that are strictly better than u
B uð Þ ¼ BS uð Þ[BR uð Þ; ð5Þ
where BS(u) and BR(u) are defined as:
BS uð Þ ¼ vaU : pR vð Þb pR uð Þ and pS vð ÞzpS uð Þf g;
BR uð Þ ¼ vaU : pR vð ÞVpR uð Þ and pS vð ÞNpS uð Þf g:
The equilibrium set E (units for which there are no
strictly better units) is defined by
E ¼ uaU : B uð Þ ¼ Kf g ð6Þ
and then the satisficing equilibrium set, ESq , is given
by
ESq ¼ E \ Rq: ð7Þ
In the next Section we will establish a method that
puts the problem of evaluating the performance of
production units, as defined in the introduction Sec-
tion, into the satisficing game theory framework by
defining satisfiability functions pS(u) and pR(u) for
each unit u.4. Satisficing performance analysis
4.1. Necessary data computation
In the real world, decisions are made by a certain
number of decision makers; this is the problem of
group decision making. For instance, strategic deci-
sions in an enterprise are taken by the executive board
members that can comprise general manager, market-
ing manager, production manager, financial manager
etc.; political decisions such as choosing a place to
build a new facility (school, hospital, airport, waste
management utilities, etc.), financing projects, etc. are
made most of the time by an elected council. In the
case of evaluation we will talk about group evalua-
tion. The fundamental characteristic of group evalua-
tion is the possible conflicting interests among DMs in
terms of importance to assign to each input item as
well as to each output item. Our purpose in this paper
is to derive a method that integrates the different
points of view of the DMs expressed through weights
assigned to items by each DM. We assume that d DMs
express their preference with regard to input items and
output items through the following weights defined on
the same scale for each class of items; but the scale
does not need to be the same for input items and
output items:
! qkj (k =1, 2, .., d; j =1, 2, .., m) is the weight
assigned by the DM k to the output item j; the
more selectable the item j is, in the view of the DM
k, the more important is the weight qkj;
! rkj(k =1, 2, .., d; j =1, 2, .., p) is the weight
assigned by the DM k to the input item j; the
more rejectable the item j is, in the view of the
DM k, the more important is the weight rkj.
We think that it is easier to ask DMs to compare
items in order to express their preferences rather than
to compare units as is often done in the multi criteria
decision literature. These weights are then combined
to define selectability weights xj
S and rejectability
weights xj
R by taking the mean value over the
DMs’ preferences:
xSj ¼
Xd
k¼1
qkj
Xm
j¼1
Xd
k¼1
qkj
and xRj ¼
Xd
k¼1
rkj
Xp
j¼1
Xd
k¼1
rkj
: ð8Þ
The weights xj
S and xj
R measure the aggregate
strength that DMs accord to the output item j and
the input item j respectively with regard to other itemsof the same category. Let us define xS and xR as row
vectors
xS ¼ xS1 xS2 . . .xSm
 
and xR xR1 x
R
2 . . .x
R
p
h i
;
and functions gS(u) and gR(u) for each unit u a U that
work toward globally selecting u or globally rejecting
u respectively as follows
gS uð Þ ¼ xSou and gR uð Þ ¼ xRiu ð9Þ
where ou and iu, defined by
ou¼ O
1
u
max
xaU
O1x
  O
2
u
max
xaU
O2x
  . . . O
m
u
max
xaU
Omx
 
3
5
T2
4
and
iu ¼ I
1
u
max
xaU
I1x
  I
2
u
max
xaU
I2x
  . . . I
p
u
max
xaU
Ipx
 
3
5
T
;
2
4
are normalized column vectors of output and input
items of unit u respectively and xT stands for the
transpose of the vector x. A normalization process
(dividing each item value by the corresponding max-
imum value) is necessary before weighting because
items do not necessarily have the same units (money,
human resources, surface area, machines, etc.). The
following definition then gives important data by
which the performance of each unit can be analyzed
in different ways (individual efficiency, efficiency
within the group) in order to suggest possibilities for
improving performance.
Definition 2. The satisfability functions pS and pR are
defined by
pS uð Þ ¼ gS uð ÞX
xaU
gS xð Þ
and
pR uð Þ ¼ gR uð ÞX
xaU
gR xð Þ
; 8 uaU; ð10Þ
the set of efficient units (individual efficiency) R is
defined by
R ¼ uaU : pS uð ÞzpR uð Þf g ð11Þ
and the efficient equilibrium set S (within-group ef-
ficiency) by
S ¼ R \ E; E ¼ uaU : B uð Þ ¼ Kf g ð12Þ
where B uð Þ is defined as in Eq. (5) of the second
section.
It is worth noticing that pS and pR both have a
probability structure. The three sets R, E and S as
well as B(u) (for each unit u) are the important data
for performance evaluation purposes. An important
question that can be raised at this stage is that of the
coherency of this method: that is, if there is a unit
that uses more input items to produce less output
items than another unit, is there a chance that the
former unit be declared as an efficient equilibrium
unit? Let us consider the following definition that
formalizes this idea.
Definition 3. A unit u a U dominates a unit v a U,
noted uvv, if and only if the following inequalities
OiuzO
i
v and I
j
uVI
j
v
hold for any output item i and any input item j with at
least one strict inequality.
The following theorem establishes the coherency
of the method: a dominated unit cannot be declared as
an efficient equilibrium unit.
Theorem 1. Let u and v belong to U. Then uvvZ u
a B(v) and so vgE.
Proof. uvvZ OujzOvj and IujV Ivj with at least one
strict inequality. As item values are assumed to be po-
sitive and xj
S z 0, xj
R z0, we have
Pm
j¼1 x
S
j O
j
u=

maxx aU O jx
 
z
Pm
j¼1 x
S
j O
j
v= max xaU O
j
v
  
andPm
j¼1 x
R
j I
j
u=maxxaU I
j
x
  
V
Pp
j¼1 x
R
j I
j
v = maxxaU

I jv
 
that is gS(u)zgS(v) and gR(u)VgR(v) and finally
pS(u)zpS(v) and pR(u)VpR(v) with at least one strict
inequality so u a B(v), that is B(v)pF and v is not an
equilibrium. 5
We are now ready to perform a performance eval-
uation and to establish the performance improvement
recommendation procedure.4.2. Performance analysis
Necessary information for performance analysis by
DMs is summarized in the sets R, E and S as well as
B(u).
! The units of the set S are those one can qualify
as bgood enoughQ; they use their resources effi-
ciently in comparison to their counterparts both
individually as well as within the organization.
! R is the set of units that use their resources
efficiently (individually) to produce their outputs
but not necessarily in the best way. If a unit u g
R, one can do a sort of sensitivity analysis to
determine the way to render it efficient by com-
puting the amount by which it must increase its
output items and the amount by which it must
reduce its input items in order to be efficient if
other units’ performances remain unchanged. To
do so, one can compute sensitivity parameters
du
iz0, i =1, 2, .., m and cu
iz0, i =1, 2,.., p,
such that, if one replaces ou(i) and iu(i) by
ou(i)+du
i and iu(i)cui, respectively, under the
conditions
0bou ið Þ þ diuV1 and 0biu ið Þ  ciuV1
then
pS uð ÞzpR uð Þ:
One can find these parameters by solving the
following nonlinear program Eq. (13),
min 0
du;cu
Co duð ÞzCi cuð Þ;
s:t: eoVou þ duV1; duz0;
eiViu  cuV1; cuz0;
ð13Þ
where
du ¼
h
d1u d
2
u:::d
m
u
iT
; cu ¼
h
c1u c
2
u:::c
p
u
iT
and 1 (respect. 0) is a column vector with appro-
priate dimension and all entries equal to 1 (re-
spect. 0); eo and ei are vectors with appropriate
min
d
u*
u ;c
u*
u
0
xSduTu ¼
pS u*ð Þ
P
vaU x
Sovð Þ xSou
1 pS u*ð Þ ;
s:t: xRcu*u ¼  pR u*ð Þ
P
vaU x
Rivð Þ xRiu
1 pR u*ð Þ ;
eoVou þ du*u V1; eiViu  cu*u V1; du*u z0; cu*u z0:
ð14Þdimensions expressing lower bounds on output
items and input items respectively; s.t. stands
for bsubjected toQ; and finally
Co duð Þ ¼ x
S ou þ duð ÞP
vaU;vpu xSou þ xS ou þ duð Þ
;
Ci cuð Þ ¼
xR iu  cuð ÞP
vaU;vpu xRiv þ xR iu  cuð Þ
:
Notice that this program is in a very general form
and other constraints can be added to take into
account practical requirements such as uniform dis-
tribution of effort for a class of items for instance, or
on the contrary concentrating the effort on some
particular items. This analysis is well suited for
units of the set E  S (units for which there is no
other units that perform better but which use ineffi-
ciently their resources individually);
du ið Þ
ou ið Þ and
cu jð Þ
iu jð Þ
are the amount by which unit u must increase its
output item i, and the amount by which it must
reduce its input item j, respectively, when perfor-
mances of all other units remain unchanged, in order
to be efficient.
! Sets B(u) may be of great importance to DMs be-
cause they can use them to identify weak points of
inefficient units and possible causes of this weak-
ness. For instance if u* a B(u); by comparing the
environments in which these units are operating, one
can identify why unit u* is performing better than
unit u and take an appropriate decision with regard
to u (make recommendations to u in order to im-
prove its performance; stop its activity, etc.) mainly
for those units of the set RS. A procedure similar
to that presented in the previous point can be used by
u to look for how to perform as good as u* , that is,
determine parameters du*u ; and c
u*
u (defined as du
and cu respectively in the previous point) so that
pS uð Þ ¼
xS ou þ du*u
 
X
vaU;vpu
xSov þ xS ou þ du*u
  ¼ pS u*
 
pR uð Þ ¼
xR iu  cu*u
 
X
vaU;vpu
xRiv þ xR iu  cu*u
  ¼ pR u*
 which can be done by solving the following linear
programming problemOne may then recommend to a dominated unit u to
improve its output items by du* and reduce its input
items by cu*, for instance, with du* and cu* defined by
duT ¼ max
uTaB uð Þ
du*u
 
and c*u ¼ max
uTaB uð Þ
cu*u
  ð15Þ
where the maximum is taken componentwise.
! The set U  R [ E contains completely inefficient
units; they do not use their resources efficiently and
do less than some other counterparts.
Remark 1. Notice that optimization problems (13)
and (14) are mathematically ill posed problems (many
solutions) ; by using other criteria and/or constraints,
for instance uniform distribution of weights du and cu
or du*u and d
u*
u , lower and upper bounds etc., one can
ensure well posedness. When a unit improves its per
formance, the configuration of the problem may
change.
4.3. Strengths and drawbacks of this approach
The approach presented so far has the following
positive points.
! It is easy to understand and to use.
! Preferences are expressed locally (for each unit) by
DMs rather than globally as is often done in the
multi criteria decision making literature.
! A dominated unit knows units that perform bet-
ter and so it can analyze the reasons for its
weakness.
! It does not necessitate important computational
power.
Some of its negative points could be the following.
! The evaluation is group related; as in the case of
the DEA, the efficiency is relative (but does abso-
lute efficiency have any sense?).
! It is necessary to normalize original data.
! Satisfiability functions do not express meaningful
parameters for the unit.
In the following Section, we will apply this method
to obtain a detailed analysis of a real world application
that comes from the DEA literature.5. Application
A large retailing organization which distributes
goods to supermarkets consists of 20 depots that
must be evaluated (see [8]). The input items are
taken to be the value of the stock (S) and the
recurrent costs in the form of wages (W). The output
items, corresponding to the activity levels of the
depots, are measured by the number of issues (I)
representing deliveries to supermarkets, the number
of receipts (Rc) in bulk from suppliers, and the
number of requisitions (Rq) on suppliers where
they are out of stock or approaching stock out.
Data for this application are presented in Table 1
of the Appendix Section.
5.1. Results
5.1.1. Equal importance items
Application of the DEA approach leads to the
results of the fourth column (see [8]) of Table 2 in
the Appendix Section which shows that the rela-
tively efficient depots are depots 12, 14, 15, and
19; for these depots there is no (possible) virtual
depot that does better. If we look closely, we can
see that depot 14 is declared efficient because of
its performance in requests item that is very high
compared to other output items; this will be
revealed when applying the method established in
this paper.
Applying the approach established in this paper,
with equal importance of items (that is, all weights
qkj, j =1, 2, 3 and rki, i=1, 2 are supposed equal to
one) leads to satisfiability functions pS and pR ofcolumns 2 and 3 of Table 2 (see Appendix section).
From satisfiability functions, we deduce the following
sets (individually efficient set, equilibrium set and
efficient equilibrium set) that are the fundamental
data for our performance analysis.
R ¼ 01; 02; 05; 09; 10; 12; 14; 15; 16; 19; 20f g;
E ¼ 02; 05; 07; 09; 10; 12; 15; 19; 20f g;
S ¼ 02; 05; 09; 10; 12; 15; 19; 20f g:
! The set ES is reduced to depot 07; it means that,
though there is no depot that performs better than
depot 07, this one is inefficiently using its
resources (it can do better). Applying the optimi-
zation problem (13) to depot 07 we obtain
d07 ¼ 0:0000 0:0299 0:0623½ Tand
c07 ¼ 0:1051 0:1051½ T
which means that, as
o07 ¼ 1:0000 0:9701 0:8769½ Tand
i07 ¼ 1:0000 0:9091½ 
if depot 07 increases its second and third output
items by 3.8% and 7.10% respectively and reduces
its resource consumption by 10.51% and 11.56%
respectively, it will be efficient, as long as other
units’ performances remain unchanged.
! RS is given by {01, 14, 16} with
B 01ð Þ ¼ 02; 09; 12; 10f g;
B 14ð Þ ¼ 01; 02; 12; 19f g;
tB 16ð Þ ¼ 01; 02; 09; 12; 14; 19f g;
the sets of depots that strictly dominate depots 01,
14 and 16 respectively. This means that though
depots 01, 14 and 16 are individually efficient,
they can do better because there are depots that
are doing better. For each of these depots, by
solving a linear programming problem of the form
(14), we obtain the results given in Tables 3–5 (see
Appendix Section) and then vectors du* and cu* as
defined by Eq. (15) are computed for possible
recommendations for performance improvement.
i) Solving the linear programming problem of the
form (14) for depot 01; we obtain the data given in
Table 3 and
d01* ¼ 0:1785 0:0273 0:1972½ T ;
c01* ¼ 0:1152 0:1250½ 
T d
So, as
o01 ¼ 0:5000 0:8209 0:4615½ T and
i01 ¼ 0:4286 0:4545½ T ;
if depot 01 increases its output items by 35.70%,
3.33% and 42.73% respectively and reduces its
input items by 26.88% and 25.70% respectively,
it becomes non-dominated if other depots maintain
their performance unchanged.
ii) As in i), we obtain for depot 14 the results given
in Table 4 and
d14* ¼ 0:1270 0:2068 0:0154½ T ;
c14* ¼ 0:1853 0:1085½ 
T
;
then, because
o14 ¼ 0:4750 0:2687 0:9846½ T and
i14 ¼ 0:5714 0:3636½ T ;
if depot 14 can increase its output items by 26.74%,
76.98% and 1.56% and reduces its input items by
32.43% and 29.84% respectively it will become
non-dominated. We see here that effort must be
made by depot 14 mainly in the improvement of
output item 2 where its performance is the worst.
iii) Finally for depot 16, the results of Table 5 are
obtained and
d*16 ¼ 0:2027 0:2885 0:0268½ T ;
c*16 ¼ 0:1426 0:1912½ Twith
o16 ¼ 0:4750 0:2985 0:9231½ T ;
i16 ¼ 0:4286 0:5455½ T
so that depot 16 can become non-dominated by
increasing its output items by 42.67%, 96.65% and
2.90% and reducing its input items by 33.27% and
35.05% respectively.
The rest of the performance results are summa-
rized below.
U  R [ E ¼ 03; 04; 06; 08; 11; 13; 17; 18f g
B 03ð Þ ¼ 02; 09; 12; 19f g;
B 04ð Þ ¼ 02; 06; 9; 10; 11; 12; 19; 20f g;
B 06ð Þ ¼ 02; 09; 19f g;
B 08ð Þ ¼ 01; 02; 03; 06; 09; 12; 14; 16; 19f g;
B 11ð Þ ¼ 09; 10; 20f g;
B 13ð Þ ¼ 01; 02; 03; 06; 09; 10; 11; 12; 14; 19; 20f g;
B 17ð Þ ¼ 07f g;
B 18ð Þ ¼ 01; 02; 03; 05; 09; 12; 14; 15; 16; 19f g:
In comparison, we see that all depots declared
efficient by the DEA method are efficient equilibrium
according to our approach except depot 14 (efficient
but dominated) that is dominated by depots 01, 02, 12
and 19 in our approach; this is due to the fact that in
the DEA approach, by putting maximum weight on
the third output item, depot 14 can be efficient since
the ratio between its third output item and input items
is very high compared to other ratios.
5.1.2. Relative importance of items
If we suppose that DMs are more sensible to wage
as resource consumption than stock and give them
weights 2 and 1 respectively (that is rk1 =1 and
rk2 =2 for any k) and they also consider that the issues
item is more important, as output, than the receipts
item which, in turn, is more important than the
Depot S(oM) W(00,000VS) I(00VS) Rc(000VS) Rq(000VS)
Depot 01 3 5 40 55 30
Depot 02 2.5 4.5 45 50 40
Depot 03 4 6 55 45 30
Depot 04 6 7 48 20 60
Depot 05 2.3 3.5 28 50 25
Depot 06 4 6.5 48 20 65
Depot 07 7 10 80 65 57requests item and give them weights 5, 3 and 1
respectively(qk1=5, qk2 =3 and qk3=1 for any k),
then the following results are obtained.
R ¼ 01; 02; 03; 05; 09; 10; 12; 15; 19; 20f g;
E ¼ 02; 07; 09; 10; 12; 15; 19; 20f g;
S ¼ 02; 09; 10; 12; 15; 19; 20f g:
Now depot 05 is no longer an efficient equilibrium
because it is dominated by depot 12; this is due to the
fact that depot 05 performs very poorly in terms of
issues, a criterion considered as very important by
DMs. Of course, a sensitivity analysis can be done
as previously.
Depot 08 4.4 6.4 25 48 30
Depot 09 3 5 45 64 42
Depot 10 5 7 70 65 48
Depot 11 5 7 45 65 40
Depot 12 2 4 45 40 44
Depot 13 5 7 65 25 35
Depot 14 4 4 38 18 64
Depot 15 2 3 20 50 15
Depot 16 3 6 38 20 60
Depot 17 7 11 68 64 54
Depot 18 4 6 25 38 20
Depot 19 3 4 45 67 32
Depot 20 5 6 57 60 40
Table 2
Depot pS(u) pR(u) DEA
efficiency
01 0.0466 0.0394 0.82
02 0.0503 0.0342 0.94
03 0.0476 0.0498 0.82
04 0.0476 0.0666 0.65
05 0.0387 0.0289 0.95
06 0.0496 0.0519 0.83
07 0.0744 0.0852 0.71
08 0.0389 0.0540 0.52
09 0.0565 0.0394 0.96
10 0.0675 0.0603 0.89
11 0.0561 0.0603 0.63
12 0.0480 0.0290 1.006. Conclusion
In this paper, a problem of evaluating a group of
production units by a group of decision makers (man-
agers, administrators, politicians, experts, etc.) has been
formulated and solved using the satisficing game theory
paradigm. Data that are used for evaluation are input
items in terms of resource consumption and output items
in terms of products or delivered services in a data
envelopment (DEA) type framework. A method based
on the satisficing game theory has been established that
allows a unit to be evaluated bindividuallyQ in terms of
its resource consumption versus its delivery perfor-
mance as well as how good it is performing with regard
to its counterparts, a within-group evaluation. This
method can be used as a complement to the DEA
approach to integrate a subjective point of view of
decision makers and for analysis of causes of possible
inefficiency. The application considered (a real world
problem) shows the feasibility of this approach and its
low demand on computational power makes it suitable
for integration in computer aid decision support sys-
tems; this point will be considered in future work.
13 0.0450 0.0603 0.83
14 0.0452 0.0417 1.00
15 0.0321 0.0249 1.00
16 0.0443 0.0435 0.91
17 0.0689 0.0892 0.55
18 0.0310 0.0498 0.42
19 0.0537 0.0354 1.00
20 0.0581 0.0562 0.84Acknowledgment
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under consideration
Table 1
Table 3
u* 02 09 12
du01* 0.0663 0.1785 0.0202
0.0073 0.0273 0.0132
0.0767 0.1972 0.0241
cu01* 0.0568 0.0002 0.1152
0.0641 0.0000 0.1250
Table 4
u* 01 02 12 19
du14* 0.0084 0.0669 0.0296 0.1270
0.0344 0.1252 0.0695 0.2068
0.0152 0.0154 0.0153 0.0119
cu14* 0.0349 0.1155 0.1853 0.1017
0.0194 0.0591 0.1085 0.0453
Table 5
u* 01 02 09 12 14 19
d16
u* 0.0176 0.0850 0.2027 0.0427 0.0001 0.1490
0.0468 0.1417 0.2885 0.0830 0.0112 0.2243
0.0268 0.0141 0.0027 0.0220 0.0238 0.0059
c16
u* 0.0375 0.0875 0.0247 0.1426 0.0171 0.0723
0.0574 0.1275 0.0701 0.1912 0.0242 0.1150References
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